By Linda O’Reilly, Special Counsel at Tompkins Wake.
Nigel Clark’s guest editorial in the December 2024 issue of this magazine got me thinking.
The headline read, ‘LG governance model doesn’t work’, and the case in point was the Wellington City Council’s struggle to fund its Long-Term Plan following the decision to reject the sale of its shares in Wellington Airport.
The resulting appointment of a Crown Observer was described as providing temporary relief but highlighted the need for more fundamental reform. Nigel suggested this might take the form of strengthening mayoral powers, and he pointed to the stronger mayoral mandate in Auckland as giving Mayor Wayne Brown a better platform to drive cost savings.
This prompted me to remind myself what powers the Mayor of Auckland has that differ from those in other local authorities and to consider whether they might usefully be extended to all territorial authorities.
My recollection was that they were quite similar, given that the extended powers given to all mayors in 2013 were modelled on the Auckland Council example, but examination revealed some significant differences.
Under both section 9 of the Local Government (Auckland Council) Act 2009 and section 41A of the Local Government Act 2002 (LGA), the role of the mayor is to lead the development of council plans, policies, and budgets for consideration by the governing body. In addition, mayors are empowered to appoint the deputy mayor, establish committees and appoint the chairpersons of those committees. Other provisions relating to appointments in Schedule 7 LGA do not apply unless the mayor has not exercised these powers. Those powers of appointment may not be delegated, and the mayor is deemed a member of each committee.
Unlike other local authorities, the Auckland model does not allow the council acting collectively under Schedule 7 LGA to remove the deputy mayor, discharge and reconstitute committees, or remove a chairperson.
Those provisions, which can enable the council to effectively undo the appointments and committees put in place by a mayor, come under consideration from time to time when there is tension between a mayor and councillors.
So the power of the Auckland mayor to control critical appointments is somewhat stronger than that under the LGA.
The leadership role of a mayor under the LGA is also slightly different for Auckland Council than for other territorial authorities. Under the Auckland Council Act the role of the mayor is to:
(a) “Articulate and promote a vision for Auckland; and
(b) provide leadership for the purpose of achieving the objectives that will contribute to that vision.”
The role of the mayor of Auckland is also to, “ensure that there is effective engagement between the Auckland Council and the people of Auckland, including those too young to vote.”
By contrast to this vision-led role for Auckland, the role of a mayor elsewhere around the country is to provide leadership to:
(a) “The other members of the territorial authority; and
(b) the people in the district of the territorial authority.”
The Auckland role definitely sounds a bit sexier, but of course there is nothing to stop a mayor anywhere from articulating their vision for their district and endeavouring to bring other elected members along. After all, the mayor of Auckland has no more ability to compel Auckland councillors than any other mayor.
What the mayor of Auckland does have that others do not is two additional powers. One is the power to “establish processes and mechanisms” for the Council to engage with the people of Auckland, which may be broken down into cultural, ethnic, geographic, or other community interest groups.
It is not clear the extent to which this has been used in Auckland, but it could prove a useful tool for community engagement if pursued elsewhere. They also have the ability, in consultation with the chief executive and within budget limitations, to establish and maintain an appropriately staffed mayoral office.
This has been a feature of the Auckland Council structure that offers a markedly different form of support to the mayor than exists in other local authorities.
Whether extending the Auckland Council’s mayoralty powers, or indeed more extensive powers, to all mayors would fix the allegedly unworkable governance model is a moot point.
It seems to me that the funding predicament Wellington City Council finds itself in could equally well have arisen under a stronger mayoral mandate since the decision at the heart of the problem (the proposed sale of airport shares) was only ever going to be decided by the full Council. Further, the Auckland Council model has not always provided plain sailing, as the residents of Auckland will attest.
If the local governance model needs reform to meet its responsibilities to the communities it serves, then more fundamental reform is needed than just strengthening the role of mayors. A better question to ask of the Wellington City Council example might have been, how did it get to the point where it believed it could not meet those responsibilities without selling the airport shares or making unpalatable decisions about encumbering ratepayers with enormous rates or debt?
This is a question that requires more than just a strong mayor to address.
A pity, because the benevolent dictator role has always been attractive. If only we could be sure they would remain benevolent once in office.